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This paper examines the relationship between remittances from interna-
tional migration and imperfections in labour and capital markets. We use
a search-matching model of the labour market to show that remittances can
have two opposing e®ects on the labour market of the source country. First,
they raise the utility of the unemployed members back home and, if a worker's
bargaining power is low, this causes the unemployment rate to rise. Second,
remittances available for investment will relax credit constraints encountered
by ¯rms. If the `investment e®ect' outweighs the `search income' e®ect, then
remittances will reduce the unemployment rate. Our empirical analysis sug-
gests that remittances have a small negative e®ect on unemployment, but a
positive and signi¯cant e®ect on investment.
JEL Classi¯cation: F22, F43
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The economic analysis of the e®ects of remittances has become an increasingly im-
portant issue in recent years because of the rapid growth of this form of ¯nancial
°ow. O±cial estimates put global remittances at around $80bn in 2002, but the
total amount, which includes °ows through uno±cial channels, is thought to be far
greater than this. Nevertheless, the o±cial level of remittances greatly exceeds the
amount received in overseas aid by developing countries. Remittances are particu-
larly important to some countries, with remittances in our sample of 19 lower and
middle income countries equal to 3.8% of GDP.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between remit-
tances from international migration and imperfections in the labour and capital
markets of the sending countries. Di®erent forces can a®ect the way labour markets
perform, especially when migration occurs between countries at di®erent stages of
development. Migration can a®ect the labour market of the origin country through
at least two channels. First, migration opportunities can in°uence the education
decision of both migrants and stayers (Stark et al., 1998). Second, when migrants
remit part of their earning to their families, they can a®ect the consumption, in-
vestment and employment decisions of stayers. The latter is the focus of this paper.
We develop a search- matching model to analyse the role of migration opportunities
and remittances on the labour market performance of the home country.
The basic idea of the paper is that migration opportunities can have two oppos-
ing e®ects on the source country's labour market. First, remittances from migrants
to their family raise the income of the unemployed individuals back home. As a
consequence, the outside option for the unemployed improves, causing the unem-
ployment rate to increase. But suppose some remittances are invested. The net
e®ect of remittances in the labour market of the home country is then far from obvi-
ous. In particular, we show that when ¯rms are ¯nancially constrained, remittances
can decrease the unemployment rate in the home labour market.
Firms in developing country often cite credit constraints as a major obstacles
1to business. Batra et al. (2002) summarise the results of a survey of more than
10,000 ¯rms in 80 countries, carried out between late 1999 and mid 2000 on the
types of constraints they faced. They report \¯rms in Central and Eastern Europe
are most likely to identify ¯nancing as a serious constraint, followed by those in
CIS (former Soviet Union) countries, and then those in Africa, South Asia, and
Latin America"(p. vi). The constraint is particularly important for small and
medium size ¯rms. The authors add \It is not surprising that whereas 50 per cent
of ¯rms in all developing regions cited ¯nancing as a serious constraints, only 40
per cent of ¯rms in OECD countries found it to be so". Clearly the lack of funds
for investment in°uences the process of economic development, and remittances
are a possible way of relaxing these constraints.1 We therefore develop a dynamic
labour matching model with capital and credit constraints. This gives us a useful
theoretical framework to discriminate between the `productive' and `unproductive'
uses of remittances.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides an overview of
the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the e®ects of migration on the
welfare of stayers. Section 3 introduces the basic model in which we explore the
e®ect of remittances on labour markets where ¯rms' level of investments are sub-
optimal owing to credit constraints. Section 4 provides an empirical analysis of the
relationship between remittances and unemployment as well as with investment and
section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A large literature has developed in recent years concerning the impact of interna-
tional migration on both the home and host countries. Apart from a few exceptions
(e.g. Davis and Weinstein, 2002), the general perception is that migration enhances
1Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another possible way of relaxing credit constraints. However
Harrison and MacMillan (2001), using ¯rm level data from the Ivory Coast, show that borrowing
by foreign ¯rms can have a negative e®ect on the credit constraints of domestic ¯rms.
2the welfare of people living in the host country even if distributional e®ects can be
important. For example, Borjas (1995) summarises this literature and reports that
immigration increases national income but only results in a small negative impact
on native wages and employment.
However, the analysis of the e®ects of migration is far from complete if we do not
take into account the e®ects of migration on the home (sending country's) labour
market. Given that it is often the most skilled individuals who migrate, the most
obvious e®ect of migration from Less Developed Countries (LDCs) is that a brain
drain could negatively a®ect the labour market of the labour exporting country,
although some recent studies argue that the brain drain need not harm LDCs (Stark
et al., 1998; Beine et al., 2001). For the remainder of this section, however, we will
focus on literature that examines the e®ects of remittances.
First we relate our theoretical model to what has been found empirically. Income
from remittances or from return migrants2 can be spent on durable and non-durable
goods or can be used in a productive way through direct investment in a project
or through savings channeled from the banking system. A number of studies have
examined the two e®ects of remittances on employment and investment, although
the analysis usually relates to only a single country.
Funkhauser (1992) notes that migration and remittances can have two e®ects on
participation decisions on the home country's labour market. The loss of the migrant
worker may mean that other household members, in particular females, enter the
labour market. However, the receipt of remittances could reduce participation rates
because of the income e®ect. He further suggests that high levels of remittance °ows
into local labour markets may increase aggregate demand and hence the demand for
labour. Using data from El Salvador, he ¯nds that remittances have a negative and
2As clari¯ed in Rapoport and Docquier (2005): \At a macro level, there are only minor di®er-
ences between remittances stricto sensu and repatriated savings upon return...... . The relevant
questions are: How much income earned abroad is repatriated? And are the amounts repatriated
being used for investment or consumption?" Therefore, we use the term \remittances" to cover
both sources of income.
3signi¯cant in°uence on the labour force participation of both males and females.
However, he ¯nds that the loss of migrants does not have a signi¯cant e®ect on local
labour markets. For females the positive but small e®ect of the local labour market
is enough to outweigh the negative remittance e®ect, but for males, the negative
income e®ect from remittances dominates all other e®ects.
Further evidence that remittances act in a similar way to welfare payments is
provided by Zachariah et al. (2001). They report that the worker-population ra-
tio was 55% amongst non-migrant households in Kerala, India but only 32% in
households with an emigrant. They suggest that this ¯nding may be caused by
employment seekers from emigrant households being more selective with regards to
their job match. Furthermore, they report unemployment rates of 21% and 8% for
emigrant and non-emigrant households respectively. They conclude their section
on the e®ect of migration on employment and unemployment with the comment
\because unemployed persons belonging to emigrant households enjoy the ¯nancial
support of the emigrant members, they are not in any hurry to get employed" (p.
55).
The idea that unemployment bene¯ts act as a safety net for the unemployed
worker is theoretically explained in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). They develop
an equilibrium search matching model with two-sided and ex ante heterogeneity
to obtain a distribution of match productivities. An increase in unemployment
bene¯ts acts as a safety net and the unemployed wait longer for better matches.
They ¯nd that in an economy with higher unemployment bene¯ts there will be a
higher unemployment rate but also a better allocation of skills to jobs.
In terms of the non-productive versus productive use of remittances, Durand
et al. (1996) report that 10% of their sample of Mexican migrants to the US who
reported that they sent remittances or brought savings back with them spent at least
some of the migrodollars (saved/remitted) productively. 14% reported that they
spent some of their migradollars on housing and the remaining 76% reported that
they spent the migradollars only on consumption. Glytsos (1993) estimates that only
44% of the estimated 14 billion drachmas sent migrant remittances to Greece in 1971
was invested in machinery and another 4% was invested in small shops, compared
with 63% on consumption, 22% on housing and 7% on land. Using input-output
analysis, he estimates that the multiplier e®ect associated with migrant remittances
is 1.7 and this is found to vary between industries. The author also estimates the
potential employment and capital e®ects of remittances amounted to around 74,000
new non-agricultural and non-public sector jobs and 8% of installed manufacturing
capacity.
Adams (1998) also ¯nds that external remittances have an important impact on
the accumulation of rural assets using Pakistani data and argues that the marginal
propensity to invest transitory income is higher than it is for labour income3. Rozelle
et al. (1999) ¯nd that remittances help to loosen the constraints on crop production
in rural China and also stimulate productivity. Furthermore, given that many LDCs
are likely to face capital and liquidity constraints, these constraints can be eased as
a result of the savings that are deposited by migrants or their families. Therefore
despite the fact that only a small proportion of remittances may be invested directly
by migrants or their families, remittances can be channeled into productive uses by
the banking system.
Kule et al. (2002), summarise the results of two surveys carried out in Albania
in 1998, one directed at individuals and another at ¯rms. It is found that over 50%
of the remittances sent to Albania were used for consumption, 16% were saved in a
bank, 7% were invested both in ¯nancial institutions and in property, and over 7%
invested in business, while ¯rms indicated that around 17% of the capital required to
establish a business came from remittances. This evidence suggests that remittances
can been seen as a way to overcome credit-constraints in the source economy4.
3He also ¯nds that remittances from international migration have a much larger impact on
the accumulation of physical assets (irrigated and rain-fed land) than remittances from internal
migration.
4There is also evidence to indicate that remittances increase human as well as physical capital
levels (Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Lopez Cordova, 2004).
5Leon-Ledesma and Piracha (2004) also adopt a positive view of the relationship
between migration and development by modeling the e®ects of short term migration
on labour productivity. Remittances can be channeled into investments and increase
productivity in the home economy. The authors study the impact of migration
and remittances on the employment performance of Central and Eastern European
Countries and claim that the main sources of migrant savings from overseas are used
productively in the home country.
Finally, this issue can also be related to the literature that explores the role of
foreign aid as an instrument for ¯nancing investment. The links between aid and
investment are quite complex. On the one hand, foreign aid ¯nances investment in
public infrastructure which can have a positive e®ect on private investments (Chat-
terjee and Turnovsky, 2005). On the other hand, aid can have an adverse impact
on domestic savings and investment (Cassen, 1986). Dollar and Easterly (1999), in
a study on African countries on the links between aid, investment and growth, ¯nd
that only 8 countries show a positive and signi¯cant relationship between aid and
investment, while there is a negative and signi¯cant relationship in 12 countries.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on matching theory has been silent
until now on the role of migration opportunities on the labour market performance
of the home country. In section 3.1 we build on Pissarides' basic model with capi-
tal. Pissarides (2000) assumes perfect capital markets and shows that the standard
unemployment model is una®ected by the introduction of capital. Firms choose the
optimal level of investment and the introduction of new savings in the economy does
not have any e®ect on the output produced by each ¯rm. In our model, we assume
that individuals are risk-averse. Moreover, the introduction of credit constraints
generates new e®ects and creates a link between the literature on matching theory
and the one that investigates the e®ects of remittances on labour exporting counties.
63 The Model: Remittances with Credit-Constrained
Firms
3.1 The Basic Model with the Capital Stock
Consider a worker living in a country characterized by unemployment owing to
search frictions in the labour market. The worker has the option to migrate and
earn a safe return abroad which we assume is given. We do not model the migration
decision of individuals and assume that a ¯xed proportion of individuals migrate
and remit back home5. These savings are used by the return migrant to increase
his expected lifetime utility in his own country. Alternatively, we can think of a
permanent migrant who remits his savings to the members of the family that decide
to stay in the home country6.
In a world with frictions it takes time to ¯nd a job. Trade is a decentralized
economic activity and coordination failures together with imperfect information are
essential elements of the trading process. The technology of meeting is summarized
by a matching function which gives the number of matches in the economy as a
function of inputs (i.e. the number of buyers and sellers). Matching functions
re°ect the fact that trading partners are not fully informed of each others' existence
because of horizontal heterogeneity in location, sectors of activity and type of skills.
Rationing arises in a world where individuals are imperfectly aware of their economic
opportunities from the stochastic nature of the matching process between partners.
The number of job meetings and matches is synthesized by the following match-
ing function7: m(u;v) where u is the unemployment rate and v the vacancy rate.
5It is beyond the scope of this paper to model the migration decision. In fact, the evidence
shows that part of the income earned abroad is repatriated in the home economy and that the
decision to remit is driven by di®erent motives. See Rapoport and Docquier (2005) for a detailed
survey on the motives to remit.
6See the previous section for the de¯nition of repatriated income earned abroad.
7The matching function is a technical device that captures the frictions of the economy. It is
possible to derive it from particular speci¯cations of the meeting process.
7This function is assumed increasing in both arguments and concave. For simplicity,
we assume that the dimension of the market does not a®ect its performance, namely
the function is homogeneous of degree one. Under this assumption, the probability
of ¯nding a match will be a function only of the ratio of unemployment to vacancies
(i.e. the `tightness' of the market), µ = v
u. Given the arrival of contacts, the indi-
vidual transitions from an unmatched to a matched state are q =
m(u;v)
v = q (µ) for
¯rms and µq (µ) for workers, with q0(µ) < 0 .
The model includes Bellman equations for the asset values of vacant and non-
vacant ¯rms, employed and unemployed workers. The ¯rm opens a vacancy, sustains
search costs c, and job creation takes place when the complementary partners meet
and agree to a way to share the rents. Let F m be the present-discounted value
of expected pro¯t from a job ¯lled by a worker from a remittance recipient family.
Similarly de¯ne F nm as the asset value of a job ¯lled by a worker from a `non-migrant'
family. Let V be the asset value for the vacant ¯rm. Introducing capital into the
model, we follow Pissarides (2000) and let k be the capital stock per e±ciency unit of
labour. Then, given the wage bargaining process speci¯ed below, the value function
for each job type is given by:
rF
i = pf(k) ¡ pk(r + ±) ¡ w
i + ¸(V ¡ F
i); i = m;nm (1)
where f (k) is the output produced by a ¯rm, which uses k capital and a worker,
wm is the wage for a worker from a `migrant family', wnm is is the wage for a worker
from a `non-migrant family', ¸ is the exogenous destruction rate of jobs and p is
a productivity parameter. Capital is lent at the exogenous market interest rate r,
which is the discount rate used to calculate asset values, and it is subject to the
depreciation rate ±.
When a vacancy is opened but the job is not ¯lled, the ¯rm does not hire capital
and its asset value in the steady-state, V , satis¯es the following Bellman equation:
rV = ¡c + q (µ)
£ ¹ F ¡ V
¤
(2)
where c represents the recruitment cost and ¹ F is the average value of a ¯lled vacancy.
8The expected value of a ¯lled job depends on the proportion of `migrants' and `non-
migrants' in the population:
¹ F = pF
m + (1 ¡ p)F
nm (3)
where p represents the probability that a vacancy is ¯lled by a migrant conditional
on the event of meeting a worker. If the ¯rm has free access to ¯nancial markets
o®ering ¯nance at the interest rate r, then the maximization of F w.r.t k gives the
standard result:
f
0(k) = r + ± (4)
An important assumption is that workers are risk-averse. Risk-averse workers
value remittances more if unemployed and the introduction of these transfers modi-
¯es their outside option. Let ¹ z denote the domestic support for the unemployed and
~ z denote income from remittances. Then zm = (¹ z + ~ z) and znm = ¹ z are the unem-
ployment incomes for the worker in a migrant and non-migrant family respectively.
Similarly, ym = (wm + ~ z) and ynm = wnm. The remaining value functions which
summarize unemployed and employed workers' asset values are then respectively:
rU
i = ln(z














for a worker in a family of type i = m;nm. (5) implies that the asset value of unem-
ployed worker of type i depends on the unemployment income and the probability
of ¯nding a job, µq (µ). (6) implies that the asset value of employed worker of type
i depends on the employment income and the exogenous probability of losing a job,
¸.
As in Ortega (2000), we assume that ¯rms are not able to discriminate ex ante
between an unemployed migrant and non-migrant since only information concerning
the average characteristics of workers is available when the vacancy is opened. This
implies that ¯rms will open the same vacancy for the non-recipient and recipient
9unemployed. In the home economy, households will bargain over two di®erent wages
and the wage for workers with migrants in the family will be higher than that of
workers in non-migrant families since they have a higher `threat point'.
In equilibrium, all ¯rms enter the market until the asset value from a vacant job,
V , is zero. By manipulating the two Bellman equations for the ¯rms and the zero
pro¯t assumptions, we can determine the job creation curve, JC:
p[f(k) ¡ (r + ±)k] ¡ w ¡
(¸ + r)pc
q(µ)
= 0; i = nm;m (7)
where
y = p[f(k) ¡ (r + ±)k]
and w is the average wage in the economy. The relation between the wage and
labour market tightness is downward sloping in the (w;µ) space.
During the bargaining stage, the partners agree on a way to share the rents.
Wages are determined as the solution to a Nash bargaining problem. Given that
the ¯rm surplus is equal to F i ¡ V and the worker surplus is Ei ¡ Ui, the wage is









i¤1¡¯ ; i = nm;m
where 0 · ¯ · 1 is the bargaining power of workers. By solving the maximization

































The wage setting curves are upward sloping relations in the (µ;wi) space.
To complete the matching model with capital, the evolution of unemployment is
given by
_ u = ¸(1 ¡ u) ¡ µq (µ)u (10)
10In the steady state, _ u = 0 and we arrive at the Beveridge Curve (BC):
u =
¸
¸ + µq (µ)
(11)
Five equations (4), (7), (8), (9) and (11) give steady-state values for k;, µ, wi and u.
The `labour market tightness' parameter µ = v
u gives the vacancy rate and completes
the description of the steady-state equilibrium8.
3.2 Credit Market Imperfections
Without some constraint on the ability to raise ¯nance for investment, remittances
can a®ect the unemployment income, but they would have no e®ect on the capital
stock. Firms would choose the optimal level of the capital stock (per e±ciency
unit of labour) at k = k¤, given by (4). However, as discussed in the introduction,
the lack of formal channels to obtain credit that characterizes many developing
and transitional countries can generate ¯nancial constraints for ¯rms. We therefore
assume that ¯rms cannot raise su±cient ¯nance to pay for their optimal choice of
capital. With credit constraints k < k¤, remittances now play a dual role since they
also relax credits constraints and enable the ¯rm to get closer to its optimal capital
stock. The increase in capital will then have a positive impact on, both, the wage
rate and the labour market tightness and a negative impact on the unemployment
rate. This is illustrated in ¯gure 1 and 2. To see this `investment e®ect' algebraically,







The second e®ect of remittances is to increase the search utility.
8Please refer to Lehmann and Van der Linden (2004) for a proof of existence and uniqueness in
the presence of risk-aversion.
9In the appendix A we show that the denominator is always negative and the numerator is
positive in presence of credit constraints.
11Lemma







since the denominator is negative and the numerator can be both positive
and negative. We show that the numerator and the search e®ect are
negative for low values of ¯ and c and for a wide gap between wages and
domestic unemployment bene¯ts..
Proof: see Appendix A.
Suppose that variables µ, k and z refer to a post-migration state with remit-
tances and in the pre-migration state without remittances they take values ¹ µ,
¡
k and
z. The model is completed by assuming there is a given proportion of workers and
entrepreneurs in the economy that receive remittances. Recipient workers use remit-
tances to increase their consumption while entrepreneurs use the income streams to
ease ¯rm's credit constraints10. Let us call s the proportion of workers who receive
and consume remittances and (1 ¡ s) the proportion of entrepreneurs who invest
remittances. In a steady state, per capita capital stock rises by ~ z (1 ¡ s)=± = ¹ k11
until such a point where k = k¤.
The complete model with migration now consists of (4), (7), (8), (9) and (11)
and the capital stock is given by:
k = ¹ k + ~ z (1 ¡ °)=± = ¹ k + ~ k; if ¹ k + ~ k · k
¤
= k
¤; if ¹ k + ~ k ¸ k
¤ (12)
.
We can now summarise our results as a proposition:
10For simplicity we assume that all entrepreneurs are recipients.
11Using _ k = ¡±k + i where i is investment.
12Proposition
Remittances can have two opposite e®ects on the unemployment rate:
First, given risk-averse workers, they increase search utility and, for low
values of ¯ and c, and for a wide gap between wages and domestic un-
employment income, the unemployment rate rises. Second, they relax
the credit constraint facing ¯rms, raising the capital stock towards its
optimal level and reducing the unemployment rate. When remittance
income is su±ciently high, the optimal capital stock is reached and any
further increase only has the search e®ect.
The analysis shows that when the workers' power over employers is low, re-
mittances have an ambiguous impact on employment while if the workers' power
is strong, then remittances have an unambiguous positive impact on employment
(negative impact on unemployment). For example, if the outside option is high, then
the impact of remittances on unemployment is negative since the search e®ect and
the investment e®ect are both positive. Similarly, remittances increase the utility of
unemployed over employed only when the initial outside option (i.e. the di®erence
between wages and domestic unemployment income) is high. In this case the search




The theoretical model presented in the previous section predicts that whilst the
e®ect of remittances on unemployment is ambiguous, they have a positive impact
on investment. In order to test these predictions, aggregate data have been collected
for those countries where remittances constitute an important part of the economy.
More speci¯cally, countries were selected if remittances were at least 1% of GDP
13during the sample period, which begins in 1976 and ¯nishes in 2003. Inclusion within
the sample also required an adequate number of observations on unemployment and
the other covariates to be included in the econometric models. As a result of these
restrictions we are left with 19 countries. However, given the lack of complete data on
remittances, unemployment and the other explanatory variables for some countries,
we have an unbalanced panel12.
Before estimating econometric models of unemployment, it is useful to observe
the importance of remittances to the countries contained in the dataset and the
extent to which these countries have su®ered from unemployment. Table 1 in Ap-
pendix C therefore reports some descriptive statistics on remittances and unemploy-
ment for the countries in the sample. Remittances are most important to Egypt,
the Dominican Republic, Morocco, Portugal, Sri Lanka and Honduras, where they
were equivalent to more than 6% of GDP over the sample period. However, there
has been a general increase in the importance of remittances to developing countries
over time. This is illustrated by the average level of remittances as a percentage of
GDP rising to 4.72% since 2000, compared to an average of 3.78% over the whole
sample period. Unemployment also varies across the countries in the sample, with
Jamaica experiencing average unemployment rates in excess of 25% between 1976
and 1985 and average rates of at least 15% in Barbados, the Dominican Republic
and Morocco. In contrast, the average unemployment rate was 5% or less in Mexico
and Pakistan13.
Given that one of the predictions from the theoretical analysis was that remit-
tances should increase investment levels in credit constrained economies, economet-
ric models which investigate the impact that remittances have on investment are
12Further details of the dataset can be found in the data appendix.
13Underemployment is also a major issue in some developing countries because their labour
markets tend not to be e±cient and they usually have large informal sectors. For an analysis of
underemployment in Trinidad and Tobago see Gorg and Strobl (2003). However, the underem-
ployment rates they present for the four countries in our sample that feature in their international
comparison in Table 1 (Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Turkey) suggest that the problem is rela-
tively small in these countries.
14also estimated. Therefore, Table 1 also reports the average level of investment for
the countries in the sample, together with the average levels of remittances given
that the sample period di®ers for some countries from the unemployment models,
as a result of data availability14. Gross Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP
is found to range from an average of 16% in Barbados to almost 30% in Nicaragua,
although most countries are clustered between 21 and 25%.
4.2 Econometric Speci¯cation
Because of the opposing e®ects that remittances are expected to have on the source
country's labour market, as shown in previous sections, and the need to control
for other in°uences on unemployment, it is necessary to test this relationship by
estimating an econometric model.
The following equation represents the general form of the model to be estimated:
uit = x
0
it + ±rit + "it
i = 1;2::n; t = 1;2::T (13)
where uit denotes the unemployment rate in country i in period t and rit the amount
that country i receives in remittances (as a proportion of GDP) in period t. xit is a
vector of regressors that represents other factors that are expected to in°uence the
unemployment rate. The parameters will predominantly be estimated using ¯xed
e®ects models. This is because of the nature of the panel under consideration (both
a relatively small N and small T) precludes the use of more sophisticated panel
data models. For example, Generalised Method of Moment Models (Arellano and
Bond, 1991) are commonly used in panels with a large N because of the potentially
endogenous nature of some of the explanatory variables. Whilst in panels with a
large T, mean group models have been developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995)
because of heterogeneity between the cross-sectional units.
14The investment variable used here is Gross Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP, which
is very similar to the Gross Domestic Investment variable created by Easterly and Sewadeh (2001)
since the correlation coe±cient between these two measures is in excess of 0.95.
15Data limitations also constrain the explanatory variables that can be included in
the econometric models. For example, few if any of the countries have information
on the types of institutions (e.g. union density, centralisation of wage bargaining,
tax wedges, employment protection, duration of bene¯ts and replacement rates)
that have been examined by recent studies of OECD unemployment (Blanchard
and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2005). Given these restrictions and the fact that
countries in the sample are less developed than those in the OECD, more dated
studies of OECD unemployment, which focus more on demand and supply factors
i.e. the in°uence of economic shocks, as well as studies that analyse unemployment in
individual developing countries have been used to inform which explanatory variables
to include.
Bruno (1986) estimates a reduced form equation for unemployment, which is
expressed as a function of the real wage gap and aggregate demand factors, namely
the real money stock and the government ¯scal de¯cit. Contractionary monetary
or ¯scal policies, to reduce in°ation, will shift the aggregate demand curve inwards.
For example, Bruno (1986) argues that a restrictive monetary policy, such as those
followed by several OECD governments in the early 1980s, should cause unemploy-
ment to rise. He includes two lags for each of the explanatory variables and estimates
a pooled model in ¯rst di®erences for 8 countries for the period 1962-1982. He ¯nds
that the lagged ¯rst di®erence of the real money supply has a negative and signi¯-
cant e®ect on unemployment but the di®erence lagged two periods is not signi¯cant
(although it is positive). The lagged di®erences for real wages have a positive and
signi¯cant in°uence on unemployment, whereas increases in the government de¯cit
cause unemployment to fall.
McCullum (1986) also includes aggregate demand factors in his model of unem-
ployment in 14 OECD countries between 1980 and 1984. The variables he uses are
the percentage change in the narrowly de¯ned money supply de°ated by the GNP
de°ator minus the trend growth in the real money supply in the preceding period
and the cyclically adjusted government budget balance as a percentage of GNP. He
16¯nds that the ¯scal and monetary multipliers have their expected e®ects and esti-
mates that a 1 per cent increase in real money supply causes a 0.18 per cent increase
in output a year later. Nickell et al. (2005) also include money supply shocks in
their model of unemployment in 20 OECD countries between 1961 and 1995.
Marquez and Pages (1997) estimate the e®ect of trade liberalisation on unem-
ployment using a panel of 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries which have at
least 15 observations with complete information. Trade liberalisation is captured by
four variables: openness, tari®s, the black market premium and a trade reform index.
Of these, they only ¯nd that the trade reform policies exert a signi¯cant in°uence
and its e®ect is to increase unemployment but they also suggest that movements
in and out of employment dominate the unemployment e®ects of the reduction in
protection. McCallum (1986) also multiplies each of the explanatory variables in his
model by the ratio of imports of goods and services to GNP for each country minus
the mean value for all countries to indicate how much the estimated parameters are
in°uenced by openness.
4.3 Results for Unemployment
Table 2 in Appendix C presents estimates of the determinants of unemployment
in developing countries. Two speci¯cations of the model are estimated. The ¯rst
speci¯cation captures the in°uence of openness, monetary and ¯scal polices, as well
as remittances and lagged unemployment and should to some extent capture the
in°uence of omitted ariables. The latter variable is included in each of the models
estimated by Nickell et al. (2005) 15. A second speci¯cation includes more dynamics,
in particular it adds the lagged values of all explanatory variables.
The impact of remittances is negative and insigni¯cant in both of the speci¯-
cations. When the lag of remittances is included, the coe±cient attached to the
15Ideally we would also like to include some measure of wages, as Bruno (1986) does. However,
wage data are not readily available for many developing economies, which means that it is not
possible to control for wages in this way.
17level of remittances is reduced when time dummies are excluded, but the lagged
term changes sign m also changes sign when time dummies are added. In terms of
the other explanatory variables, the in°uence of the lagged unemployment term is
positive and also highly signi¯cant. The coe±cient attached to the lagged depen-
dent variable is in excess of 0.7 in all cases, which is of similar magnitude to the
Generalised Least Squares estimates obtained by Nickell et al. (2005) for OECD
countries16. In both of the speci¯cations, the coe±cient attached to the money
supply variable is positive, which is contrary to expectations and to the ¯ndings
of Bruno (1986), but it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The coe±cients on
the other explanatory variables also tend not to reach the commonly used levels of
signi¯cance, although higher de¯cit levels are associated with lower unemployment
rates at the 5% level in the ¯rst speci¯cation when time dummies are included.
4.4 Results for Investment
To further examine the e®ect that remittances have on relaxing credit constraints,
Table 3 in Appendix C reports panel data estimates for the determinants of Gross
Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP. Knack and Keefer (1997) use a similar
dependent variable to examine the e®ect that social capital has on economic per-
formance in 29 countries. To estimate the determinants of investment, we mainly
follow the empirical strategy used by Pindyck and Solimano (1993) and Goel and
Ram (2001), by including uncertainty (proxied by the 5-year moving average of
in°ation), the real lending rate (proxied by the real interest rate) and the change
in economic activity (proxied by the one-period lag on the rate of growth of real
GDP) as explanatory variables. We also add controls for remittances and aid to
this speci¯cation, the latter variable is included to compare its e®ect relative to that
of remittances. The basic model is initially estimated by OLS and subsequently
by ¯xed e®ects. A second speci¯cation replaces the contemporaneous remittances
16The coe±cient on the remittances variable is similar if the lagged dependent variable is excluded
and remains insigni¯cant at the 5% level.
18variable with its lagged value because of the possible endogeneity of the variable
when entered as a level. Estimates from the ¯xed e®ects models which include time
dummies are also reported.
In speci¯cation 1, the e®ect of the current level of remittances on investment is
particularly strong and highly signi¯cant, which appears to provide strong support
for the hypothesis that remittances ease credit constraints in developing countries.
This result is obtained regardless of whether the model is estimated using OLS or
¯xed e®ects and whether time dummies are included or not. The other variables also
generally have their expected signs. The in°uence of the lag of economic activity is
particularly strong, whilst the measure of uncertainty is signi¯cant at the 15% level
or better. The impact of the real interest rate is weak, which is consistent with the
¯ndings of Goel and Ram (2001), since they do not report a signi¯cant e®ect for this
variable in any of their models. Aid also exerts a signi¯cant in°uence on investment
when OLS is used but the coe±cient loses signi¯cance and also changes sign once
¯xed e®ects are controlled for. This is in accordance with the ¯ndings of Rajan and
Subramanian (2005), who note that remittances may not increase the demand for
scarce resources as much as aid and may simutaneously contribute to their supply.
The e®ect of remittances is slightly weakened in the second speci¯cation, which
includes the lag of remittances rather than the level but it still remains large and
highly signi¯cant.
5 Conclusions
Given that the remittances that accrue from international migration are becoming
an ever increasing and important aspect of the global economy, it is important to
examine the impact of such °ows. In this paper, the focus has been placed on the
e®ect that remittances have on the source economy, in particular what impact they
have on unemployment. It is argued that remittances can have two opposing e®ects
on unemployment in the labour exporting country. Firstly, unemployment could
be raised if remittances are seen by their recipients as providing some sort of wel-
19fare payment. Secondly, remittances could reduce credit constraints in developing
economies and hence encourage ¯rms to increase their investment levels. The over-
all e®ect on unemployment will depend on which of these e®ects dominates.17 The
relationship between remittances and unemployment was tested using data from a
panel of developing economies. It is found that remittances have negative but in-
signi¯cant e®ect on unemployment, thus suggesting that the investment and search
income e®ects of remittances have partially o®setting in°uences. The e®ect of remit-
tances on investment was also tested econometrically and the results indicate that
there is a stronger relationship between investment and remittances. In particular,
a positive and signi¯cant association is found to exist between remittances and a
country's investment levels in the ¯xed e®ects models that are estimated.
The analysis in this paper has mainly been conducted at an aggregate level,
both in terms of the theory and empirics. This has a number of advantages such
as providing an overall perspective on the e®ects of remittances. However, to gain
a better understanding of the links between remittances, the decision to work and
investment, it is also necessary to examine these relationships at a more disaggre-
gated level. For example, performing the theoretical analysis at the household level
and examining microdata would provide further insights into these important is-
sues, which could be used to inform on the likely impact of particular development
policies. Thus, future research should be focused in this direction.
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We call f1 the ¯rst relation and f2 the second one. We can take the average expression





and substitute in f1 f2: We then obtain two relations in function of µ: The average wage













We also know, from the free-entry condition that:
w = py ¡
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dk in order to investigate the search income
and the investment e®ects algebrically. Let us de¯ne:
F1 (µ) = f1 (µ;¾ (µ))
F2 (µ) = f2 (µ;¾ (µ))
where wi = ¾i (µ) > 0:
For example:
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and positive in presence of credit constraints.
By totally di®erentiating
F (µ) = 0
with respect to
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As before, the denominator is always negative and the sign of the two expressions






when credit constraints are binding while F
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which is satis¯ed for values of ¯ small enough.
26B Data Appendix and Results
B.1 De¯nitions of variables included in the model and data
sources
Dependent variables
Unemployment rate - De¯nitions vary slightly by country but typically relate to the num-
ber of unemployed divided by the economically active population. Main source: Inter-
national Labour Organisation (ILO). These data are used if there are any inconsistencies
with the other sources, which include the World Bank's World Development Indicators
(WDI), the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
Turnham and Erocal (1990).
Investment - Gross Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP. Source: WDI.
Explanatory variables
Remittances - Total amount of workers' remittances received in the country as recorded in
the Balance of Payment Statistics in current US$ as a percentage of GDP. Source: WDI.
Money Supply - Money and Quasi Money (M2) as a percentage of GDP. Source: Easterly-
Sewadeh and WDI.
Openness - Total trade as a percentage of GDP. Sources: Easterly-Sewadeh and WDI.
Fiscal Policy - Budget de¯cit as a percentage of GDP. Source: IFS and WDI.
Uncertainty 5-year Moving Average of the Consumer Price Index. Source: WDI.
Economic Activity Real Growth Rate of GDP. Source: WDI.
Real interest rates - Nominal interest rate minus the in°ation rate. Source: WDI.
Aid - Aid as a percentage of GNI. Source: WDI.
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Figure 2: The E®ect of an Increase in Capital on Unemployment and
Vacancy Rates
28Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Countries in Dataset










Barbados 1987-2002 15.8 2.31 1987-2002 16.29 2.31
Belize 1994-1997 12.5 2.31 1984-2003 24.08 3.73
Columbia 1976-2003 11.5 1.07 1986-2003 18.61 1.54
Croatia 1994-2002 13.4 2.67 1994-2003 23.44 2.68
Dominican Republic 1992-2001 16.4 7.23 1991-2003 22.36 7.55
Ecuador 1990-2003 9.2 3.41 1990-2003 21.73 3.41
Egypt 1977-1984, 7.8 8.24 1977-2003 23.85 8.19
1990-2002
Greece 1981-1997 7.8 2.28 1976-1990 25.06 2.31
Honduras 1996-2002 4.7 6.09 1987-2003 28.30 4.10
Jamaica 1976-1985 25.6 1.88 1976-2003 23.89 5.25
Mexico 1981-1988, 3.4 1.04 1993-2003 22.36 1.29
1992-2003
Morocco 1986-2003 17.9 6.97 1978-2003 23.37 6.76
Nicaragua 1992-2002 14.4 4.80 1992-2003 29.63 5.29
Pakistan 1981-2002 5.0 4.72 - - -
Paraguay 1990-2001 7.0 1.33 1990-2003 23.09 1.40
Peru 1991-2001 7.9 1.04 1991-2000 21.32 1.00
Portugal 1980-1998 6.7 6.40 - - -
Sri Lanka 1991-2001 11.5 6.21 1978-2001 24.97 5.51
Turkey 1983-2001 8.6 2.23 - - -
All Countries 1976-2003 10.3 3.78 1976-2003 23.36 4.37
Notes: Pakistan and Turkey are excluded from the investment models because of a lack of data on
interest rates in these countries, whilst there is no information on aid to Portugal.
29Table 2: Fixed E®ects Estimates of Unemployment in Developing Coun-
tries
(1) (2)
FE FE FE FE
uit¡1 0.724 0.723 0.721 0.719
(0.057) (0.060) (0.045) (0.049)
rit -0.119 -0.133 -0.102 -0.160
(0.075) (0.095) (0.122) (0.131)
rit¡1 - - -0.028 0.024
(0.120) (0.129)
mit 0.017 0.007 0.032 0.028
(0.014) (0.018) (0.039) (0.045)
mit¡1 - - -0.012 -0.021
(0.039) (0.045)
dit -0.050 -0.080 -0.035 -0.058
(0.034) (0.038) (0.053) (0.056)
dit¡1 - - -0.028 -0.046
(0.055) (0.058)
oit -0.017 -0.020 -0.010 -0.009
(0.010) (0.014) ((0.019) (0.021)
oit¡1 - - -0.010 -0.015
(0.020) (0.022)
Constant 3.456 4.958 3.562 5.240
(0.943) (1.307) (1.004) (1.683)
Time Dummies No Yes No Yes
R2 0.569 0.616 0.571 0.619
NT 260 260 260 260
Notes:
1. The explanatory variables in the table are as follows: u denotes the unemployment
rate, r remittances as a percentage of GDP, m the money supply as a percentage of GDP,
d the budget de¯cit as a percentage of GDP, and o is a measure of openess. See the data
appendix for details of the de¯nitions and sources of these variables.
2. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
30Table 3: Panel Estimates of Investment in Developing Countries
(1) (2)
OLS FE FE FE FE
pit -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
git¡1 0.322 0.418 0.437 0.428 0.451
(0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.067) (0.074)
iit 0.005 -0.023 -0.016 -0.009 -0.001
(0.027) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034)
rit 0.428 0.784 0.827 - -
(0.107) (0.118) (0.124)
rit¡1 - - - 0.701 0.733
(0.129) (0.138)
ait 0.309 -0.034 -0.141 0.014 -0.058
(0.075) (0.104) (0.132) (0.128) (0.146)
Constant 19.268 18.978 17.430 19.134 -17.142
(0.637) (0.826) (3.047) (0.932) (3.256)
Time Dummies No No Yes No Yes
R2 0.315 0.328 0.402 0.275 0.352
NT 245 245 245 245 245
Notes:
1. The explanatory variables in the table are as follows: p denotes the 5-year moving
average of the in°ation rate, g the real growth rate, i the real interest rate, r remittances
as a percentage of GDP and a aid as a percentage of GNI .
2. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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